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1 Introduction
In this chapter, we review an approach to policy assessment that has been
developed in the last two decades. This approach can be characterized by
four features. The first feature is that it looks for evaluation criteria that are
consistent with Pareto efficiency.1 That means that individual preferences
play a crucial role. Those preferences are assumed to be self-centered and to
represent agents’ well-informed and rational rankings of bundles of resources.
The second feature of the approach is that it follows the ethical objective
of resource equality.2 More precisely, it is only consistent with the view that
some version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is desirable, that is, social
justice requires that resources be redistributed from richer to poorer agents.
Which resources are relevant to give a precise meaning to this objective is a
key question to which we return when we define the approach more precisely
in the next section and when we present applications of the approach in
Section 3.
The third feature of the approach is that, in addition to the information
about the available resources in the economy, the only information about
agents that is considered relevant is the information about the ordinal and
non-comparable satisfaction of their preferences. That means that the only
relevant information about agents consists of the sets of bundles of resources
to which an agent is indifferent (the indifference curves, or indifference sur-
faces, or preference-equivalence classes) and how agents rank these sets. To
be even more precise, that means that the information that is considered not
to be available is a meaningful numerical representation of the preferences,
according to which, for instance, there is the same utility difference between
bundles (2, 2, 2) and (1, 1, 1) as between bundles (3, 3, 3) and (2, 2, 2), or the
information that a given agent has the same satisfaction level with her cur-
rent consumption as another agent with her own. Any information of either
of these two kinds (measurability and comparability) is considered unavail-
1Throughout this chapter, we refer to the strong version of Pareto efficiency. If all
agents weakly prefer an allocation over another one, then society also prefers the former.
If, in addition, one agent strictly prefers the first allocation, then society also strictly
prefers it.
2While the approach has mainly been developed in economic models in which the
different dimensions are quantities of commodities, it can be applied to wider spaces, for
instance when the different dimensions are functionings. See Fleurbaey and Maniquet,
2011a, Chapter 7.
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able or irrelevant. As it will become clear in Section 2, starting with this
limited information will not prevent us from constructing different ways of
measuring well-being indices and comparing well-being levels across agents.
What is thus key in the SOF approach is that no information of this kind is
assumed from the outset.
One motivation for restricting the analysis to that information is the view
that human beings are morally autonomous agents, so that their choices
should be respected and how far they go in the fulfillment of their aspiration
or how successful they are in the accomplishment of what they consider a
good life is irrelevant for the allocation of resources. This motivation implies
that the only legitimate reason to use information about individual satisfac-
tion levels comes from the objective of taking Pareto efficiency into account.
It is well known that ordinal and non-comparable satisfaction levels are all
we need to apply the Pareto criterion. As a consequence, the SOF approach
limits itself to using ordinal and non-comparable information on preferences
in order to combine efficiency and resource equality views (see also Fleurbaey,
chapter , this Handbook, for another derivation of ordinalism).
Another legitimate motivation for restricting one’s attention to preference
satisfaction is the practical difficulty to extract more information. It is well-
known that choices only reveal information of that nature and obtaining more
information may raise unsolvable manipulation issues (information about
preferences can also be drawn from different kinds of expressed preferences,
among which satisfaction surveys. See Decancq and Neumann, chapter , this
Hanbook).
The fourth feature of the approach is that the criteria that are built
are complete orderings of the set of relevant allocations of resources. Such
orderings are called Social Ordering Functions (SOF). Social orderings are
typically built as a function of the relevant parameters of the problem at
hand. The word “Social” refers to the fact that the objects that are ranked
are social allocations, that is, lists of bundles for all members of the society.
The word “Ordering” refers to the fact that the objective is simply to rank
those lists and not (necessarily) to construct a notion of social “Welfare.”
To sum up, a fair SOF is a formal object that associates to each economy
in an admissible domain of economies a complete ordering of the relevant set
of allocations. Such orderings are required to be consistent with the Pareto
criterion and to satisfy some version of the Pigou-Dalton resource transfer
principle. The admissible argument of a SOF is the information about the
resources available in the economy as well as the ordinal and non-comparable
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individual preferences. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011a) provide an extensive
description of the literature on SOF’s. This chapter relies heavily on that
book, which will serve as a general bibliographic reference for this chapter.
The SOF approach is characterized by the four features outlined above,
but it shares each feature with many other approaches in welfare economics,
including, of course, approaches reviewed in this Handbook. All approaches
look for criteria that are compatible with the Pareto criterion, except the
multidimensional social indices approach reviewed by Chakravarty and Lugo,
chapter , this Handbook. That approach, on the other hand, also respects
the objective of resource equality, an objective that is shared by the theory
of fair allocation. The main difference between the theory of SOF’s and that
of fair allocation is that the latter does not look for complete rankings of the
possible allocations. It limits itself to identifying the set of best allocations.
We return to the theory of fair allocation in Section 4. Looking for com-
plete orderings of the allocations, however, is standard in welfare economics,
since Bergson, Samuelson and Arrow. Welfarism also provides us with com-
plete orderings. Cost-benefit analysis, reviewed by Boadway, chapter , this
Handbook, is also able to provide complete and transitive criteria. On the
other hand, those criteria are not based on any reference to the objective of
resource equality. Finally, limiting the relevant information about agents to
ordinal and non-comparable preferences is also standard, although welfarism
typically aggregates welfare levels that have a cardinal meaning and/or that
are interpersonally comparable. We also return to welfarism in Section 4.
In Section 2, we describe the main achievements of the SOF approach. In
Section 3, we present two applications, which show how SOF’s can be used
to evaluate policies. The first application concerns labor income taxation.
The second application concerns the measurement of poverty. In Section
4, we discuss the relationship between the SOF approach and some other
approaches to the construction of criteria to evaluate policies.
2 Fair Social Ordering Functions
In this section, we present the main lessons that are to be drawn from the
literature on SOF’s. The first lesson is about the relationship between Pareto
efficiency and resource equality. The second lesson is about the way SOF’s
aggregate satisfaction levels. The third lesson is about the diversity of SOF’s
that turn out to be justified.
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The SOF approach aims at providing policy evaluation criteria. Those
criteria are formally derived by imposing desirable requirements, axioms, to
SOF’s. The requirements combine Pareto efficiency with the objective of
resource equality. It is transparent that these two objectives are conflicting.
Indeed, equally dividing all resources that are available in society obviously
meets the latter objective, but it is typically Pareto inefficient when agents
have different preferences.
Pareto efficiency forces us to evaluate policies on the basis of their effect
on preference satisfaction, but equality of resources forces us to carefully
look at the different components of the bundle of goods consumed by each
agent. The conflict between the two objectives has been studied since at
least Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) and has been given its most general
formulation by Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003). These authors show that a
SOF satisfying the Pareto criterion fails to be quasi-concave in commodities.
To put it differently, if a ranking of allocations satisfy the Pareto criterion,
then there must exist a situation in which one agent consumes strictly more of
all goods than another agent and transferring even small quantities of goods
from the former to the latter agent leads to a worse allocation in terms of
the social ranking.
This conflict forces us to give priority either to the Pareto criterion or
to resource equality. One can see the theory of multidimensional inequality
measurement as the theory that can be developed if we give priority to the
objective of resource equality and drop the Pareto criterion. The SOF ap-
proach, on the contrary, gives priority to the Pareto criterion. The first lesson
that can be drawn from the literature, consequently, is that the objective of
resource equality has to be amended in ways that are compatible with the
Pareto criterion. An example of such amendment is the requirement that
the objective of resource equality holds at least among agents identical in all
dimensions, including their preferences. This is a weak requirement and it is
satisfied by all the SOF’s that are proposed in the literature.
Other resource equality requirements, more ambitious than the restric-
tion to identical agents, have been studied. They typically depend on the
particular resource allocation problem one is studying. If the problem is one
of the division of unproduced goods, then equal split of the goods may play a
particular role. One may require that the objective of resource equality holds
between an agent who consumes more than equal split and an agent who con-
sumes less (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2008). If production takes place
and agents privately contribute to the production, by providing labor time
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for instance, then the reference to the laisser-faire allocation in economies
where all agents have the same production skills may help us define an ob-
jective of resource equality that is also compatible with the Pareto criterion
(see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2006).
Many SOF’s can be defined, in different environments, on the basis of
the Pareto criterion and amendments to the objective of resource equality.
To select among those many SOF’s, robustness requirements are added. Ro-
bustness requirements follow two ideas. The first idea is that a good SOF
should be simple, that is, the social ranking between two allocations should
only depend on a limited amount of information. The second, related, idea
is that the social ranking in a particular problem should be similar to the
social ranking in a similar problem.
There are several sets of robustness requirements. For the sake of this
presentation, it is useful to give some details about one of them. One may
require, specifically, that the social ranking between two allocations depend
on a limited amount of information about the agents’ preferences. This is
reminiscent of the celebrated Arrovian Independence property. Arrow (1963)
studied the consequence of requiring that the social ranking towards two
allocations only depend on agents’ preferences over those two allocations. It
is well known that this requirement, combined with the Pareto criterion, leads
to dictatorial social orderings. The following weakening of Independence,
proposed by Hansson (1973), is sufficient to escape from Arrow’s dictatorship
result and select among social orderings satisfying the Pareto criterion and
resource equality requirements. It requires that the social ordering between
two allocations only depend on the agents’ indifference curves containing the
bundles they are assigned in these two allocations. In terms of choices, that
requirement can be defined as follows. If an agent’s preferences change in
such a way that all binary choices involving the bundles obtained by that
agent in two allocations remain unchanged, then the social ordering towards
these two allocations remains unchanged as well.
Imposing the Pareto criterion, fairness properties and this independence
requirement turn out to have a further, unexpected, consequence. Several
scholarly contributions have proven, indeed, that the combination of these
three requirements imply that the only acceptable SOF’s are of the maximin
type (this scholarship is reviewed in Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011a, Chap-
ter 3). That is, any SOF satisfying the three types of requirements orders
allocations in the following way: first, a well-being index is built to measure
the agents’ satisfaction levels, and, second, the individual well-being levels
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are aggregated using a maximin aggregator, which means that the primary
objective is to maximize the minimal well-being level.3
The reasoning why the aggregator needs to try to maximize the minimal
well-being level goes as follows. The Pareto criterion forces us to aggregate
satisfaction levels, which means that not too much attention can be paid
to the bundles of goods consumed by the agents. On the other hand, the
fairness objective forces us to look at what agents consume, as we would like
to equalize assigned resources. The typical fairness requirement is that a
progressive transfer from an agent consuming strictly more of all the goods
than another agent to the latter should be a social improvement, at least
when these two agents have the same preferences. Combining the Pareto
criterion with this transfer requirement turns out to be very demanding.
This is typically the case when the shape of the preferences of the agents is
such that the value for them of a given transfer depends on the bundle they
originally consume when they receive that transfer. It can be shown that a
transfer of a given amount of resources from a relatively richer agent to a
relatively poorer agent may be equivalent, in terms of preferences satisfaction,
to the loss of an arbitrarily large amount of resources by the richer agent
combined with the gain of an arbitrarily small amount of resources by the
relatively poor one.
Let us, for instance, consider the balanced transfer of $ 100 between two
agents working half time. If income effects are large and depend on the
satisfaction levels of the agents, it can perfectly well be the case that loosing
$ 100 for the richer agent when she works half time is equivalent, in terms of
preference satisfaction, to loosing a much larger amount, say $ 500, when she
works full time, and, at the same time, gaining $ 100 for the poorer agent
when she works half time is equivalent to gaining a much lower amount, say
$ 50, when working full time. If the transfer when they both work half time
is viewed as a social improvement, then the following leaky bucket transfer
should also be viewed as a social improvement when they both work full
time: take $500 away from the pocket of the richer agent, and only give $ 50
to the poorer agent.
Adding the requirement that the social ordering function should not de-
3Here we call maximin all the aggregators that begin by strictly preferring the allocation
in which the lowest well-being level is the highest, independently of how they break ties
when the lowest well-being levels are identical in two allocations. This is why we sometimes
speak of the maximin family of aggregators. The leximin aggregator, defined below, is the
most prominent example of a maximin aggregator, but many others can be thought of.
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pend on changes in preferences that do not affect the indifference surface of
the agents at the contemplated allocations does not allow us to rank allo-
cations as a function of the different values one given transfer of resources
may have for an agent. As a consequence, transfers are a social improvement
only if we use a maximin aggregator. Going back to our example, it means
that any leaky bucket transfer between two agents can be decomposed into
a series of other, smaller, leaky bucket transfers that all are equivalent, in
terms of preference satisfaction, to balanced transfers. The fact that robust-
ness properties do not allow us to check whether a leaky bucket transfer can
indeed be decomposed into a series of transfers having that property forces
us to do as if such a decomposition was possible, with the outcome that any
arbitrarily small improvement for a poorer agent leads to an allocation that
is higher in the social ranking, however large the loss of the richer agent.
As a matter of fact, other robustness requirements that are not indepen-
dence requirements with respect to changes in preferences also lead to SOF’s
of the maximin type. It is, therefore, the second lesson of the literature that
admissible SOF’s must aggregate well-being levels in a maximin way, when
the requirements we have presented above are imposed.
The application of the SOF approach to labor income taxation below
will illustrate the practical advantages of having to maximize social rankings
of the maximin type. The maximin results of the SOF literature, however,
should not hide the large variety of SOF’s that enter the maximin family. The
third lesson of the literature, indeed, is that many indices of well-being can be
justified by different combinations of Pareto, resource equality and robustness
requirements. We illustrate this variety in the simple pure fair division model,
following Fleurbaey (2005) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2008).
Let us assume that there are L goods, and each entry in the vector Ω ∈
RL++ is the total amount available of one such good. As a result, Ω contains all
the relevant information about the resources available in that economy, and
these resources have to be divided among agents having equal rights on them.
Agents have continuous, monotonic and convex preferences. Preferences may
differ across agents. There are two main SOF’s that can be used in order to
allocate goods among the agents.
The first SOF relies on the concept of “egalitarian-equivalence” and ap-
plies the leximin criterion to specific individual well-being indices. The lex-
imin criterion consists in applying the maximin criterion lexicographically:
first, prefer the allocation with the largest minimal well-being level, then, in
case of a tie, prefer the allocation with the largest second lowest one, etc. The
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specific individual well-being levels to which the leximin criterion is applied
by the SOF are defined as follows. They evaluate every agent’s bundle by
the fraction of Ω to which this agent is indifferent.
The concept of “egalitarian-equivalence” has a long tradition in welfare
economics (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011a, Chapter 1, for details). The
specific SOF we are interested in here was introduced by Pazner and Schmei-
dler (1978). It is illustrated in Figure 1. There are two agents. Their
preferences, denoted R1 and R2, are represented by two indifference curves.
We have to order two allocations, (x1, x2) and (x
′
1, x
′
2). Agent 1 is indifferent
between consuming the bundle of goods x1 and a fraction λ1 of the resources
to be allocated. We compute λ2, λ
′
1 and λ
′
2 the same way. We are thus left
with comparing the vectors (λ1, λ2) and (λ
′
1, λ
′
2) by using the leximin. As
λ′2, the minimal well-being level at (x
′
1, x
′
2), is larger than λ1, the minimal
well-being level at (x1, x2), we conclude that allocation (x
′
1, x
′
2) is socially
preferred to (x1, x2).
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Figure 1: Illustration of an egalitarian equivalent SOF. Allocation (x′1, x
′
2) is
socially preferred to (x1, x2).
The second SOF we present here has a Walrasian flavor. It relies on the
maximin criterion applied to money-metric utilities (for a complete discussion
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of money-metric utility, see Fleurbaey, chapter , this Handbook), but with
the peculiar feature that the reference price that serves to measure such
utilities is specific to every allocation, and is computed so as to obtain the
most favorable maximin evaluation for the contemplated allocation. It is
illustrated in Figure 2. One allocation, (x1, x2, x3), is represented, together
with the indifference curves of the three agents through their bundles. A line
is tangent to the indifference curves of agents 1 and 2. That line corresponds
to a budget line at price p. This allows us to compute what can be called the
equivalent endowments of the agents. The equivalent endowments of both
agents 1 and 2, at that price vector, can be measured by the fraction λ1 = λ2
of the total social endowment. For each such price vector, by tangency with
the indifference curves, an individual equivalent endowment can be measured
for each agent. Let us observe that price p is the precise vector that maximizes
the minimal such endowment, when they are measured in fractions of Ω.
Vector p can also be used to measure the equivalent endowment of agent 3,
λ3, in a similar way, by tangency with her indifference curve. The resulting
endowment would be larger than that of agent 1 or 2. In conclusion, choosing
the vector p that maximizes the minimal equivalent endowment gives us a
way to transform an allocation into a list of individual numbers (λ1, λ2, λ3).
The SOF we are interested in here works by applying the leximin criterion
to those lists of numbers.
Both SOF’s presented above satisfy the Pareto criterion. They also satisfy
similar robustness properties. The main difference between them lies in the
resource equality requirement each of them meets. The first SOF satisfies the
requirement that a redistribution from an agent consuming a larger bundle
than the equal-split share of the endowment to an agent consuming less is
a social improvement. The second SOF satisfies the requirement that the
allocations that are considered socially best among the feasible allocations
are no-envy allocations: no agent strictly prefers the bundle assigned to
another agent to her own bundle.
Those two resource equality requirements are relevant for the division
problem of a social endowment of goods. The literature on SOF’s has shown
that different allocation problems could involve different resource equality
requirements, which, in turn, combined with Pareto and robustness require-
ments, would justify different SOF’s. The research agenda of that literature
consists first in studying resource equality requirements in different alloca-
tion problems to characterize relevant SOF’s and then to apply those SOF’s
to the evaluation of policies, as we exemplify in Section 3 below. Let us con-
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Figure 2: Illustration of a Walrasian SOF. Allocation (x1, x2, x3) is trans-
formed into (λ1, λ2, λ3). The leximin aggregator is applied to those numbers.
clude this section by noting that the allocation problems to which the SOF
approach has been applied is extending, and it includes production of pub-
lic goods problems (see Maniquet and Sprumont, 2004, 2005, Fleurbaey and
Sprumont, 2009), allocation of indivisible objects (Maniquet, 2008), the pure
compensation problem (Valletta, 2009), the allocation problem with unequal
production skills (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2011b), and
the allocation problem when agents have unequal health statuses (Fleurbaey,
2005b, Valletta, 2012, and Fleurbaey and Valletta, 2014).
The two SOF’s presented above also illustrate how the SOF approach
allows us to construct comparable well-being indices from non-comparable
preferences. The information that is given at the beginning consists of the
map of indifference curves of each agent. Nothing is available to compare
them. The requirements that are imposed on the social rankings can only
be satisfied if allocations are compared on the basis of the leximin criterion
applied to those vectors of λ’s. They can be viewed as well-being indices,
and, crucially, comparable ones. In Figure 1, for instance, it becomes mean-
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ingful to claim that agent 1 consuming bundle x1 is worse-off than agent 2
consuming x′2. It is also a consequence of the requirements we impose that
those well-being indices remain ordinal. Because we have to apply the lex-
imin aggregator, the difference in well-being between agent 1 consuming x1
and x′1 is meaningless. It is not needed to rank allocations according to the
efficiency, resource equality and robustness requirements that characterize
that SOF.
3 Applications
In this section, we present two policy evaluations that are based on SOF’s.
The first application bears on the design of a reform of the labor income tax
system. The second application bears on the measurement of poverty. As we
will see, a key difference between the two applications is that the first one
does not require to estimate individual preferences (it is sufficient to know
that some specific preferences exist in society), whereas the second one does.
3.1 A reform of the labor income tax system
Labor income tax systems typically require that taxpayers pay an amount
that only depends on their gross income. This excludes computing taxes as a
function of skill or labor time. This is justified by the fact that gross incomes
are typically easier to observe (or less easy to manipulate) than skills or labor
time. It is the typical assumption in the optimal tax literature since Mirrlees
(1971).
A taxpayer, as a result, faces a tax function that determines how much
tax she will have to pay as a function of her gross income. She chooses how
much gross income to earn as a function of that tax function.
Optimal tax theory is concerned with the design of such tax function
under the objective of maximizing an ethical objective, which is represented
by a social welfare function. The typical assumption is that the planner
only knows the distribution of skills and preferences in the population but is
unable to identify the skill and preferences of any given agent.
SOF’s can be used to evaluate tax functions (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet,
2006, 2007, 2011a, 2011b). This is what we illustrate in this section. We
begin by defining one specific SOF that was characterized in the literature
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(see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011a and 2011b). Then we show how to use
it to evaluate a tax function.
This SOF works by applying the leximin criterion to the following well-
being measure, inspired by Kolm (1996): the well-being of an agent is equal
to the income that agent would earn by working half time and by being
paid at her actual skill in budgetary conditions that leave her indifferent to
her actual situation. This well-being measure bears some similarity with the
second example in the previous section. It is illustrated in Figure 3. The
relevant consumption set is composed of two goods, labor time, measured
horizontally, and the consumption of some good (or income), measured ver-
tically. An agent is represented, consuming bundle xi. Her preferences, Ri,
are illustrated via the indifference curve through xi. This agent is indifferent
between consuming xi and being free to choose her labor time in the budget
set that is represented in the figure. Let us call it the equivalent budget of
agent i at xi. The slope of this budget set, mentioned in parentheses below
the budget frontier, is equal to the skill of that agent, si. This is how the
skill influences the measurement of the well-being index of that agent, and
this is why that well-being measure exhibits some Walrasian flavor. Finally,
the well-being level of that agent at xi, denoted wi, is equal to the income
associated with a labor time of 0.5 at the equivalent budget.
The question can be stated as follows: given a tax function, how can
we measure the well-being of relevant agents, and how can we go from the
measurement of well-being to the evaluation of the tax function?
The measurement of well-being based on the tax function is illustrated in
Figure 4. The C function determines consumption (that is, after-tax income)
as a function of gross (that is, pre-tax) income. The 45◦ line, with a slope
of 1 mentioned below it, corresponds to the C function that would prevail in
the absence of taxation. Indeed, if agents are paid according to their skills
and no tax is collected, then any additional unit of gross income leads to an
identical additional unit of consumption.
Let us fix a gross income level, say y. What can be said about the well-
being of agents earning precisely y? Something precise can be said under
the assumption that at least one agent earning y, let us call her i, works full
time, that is, has a labor time `i = 1. The choice of a full time job reveals,
first, that her skill si is equal to y, and, second, that this agent prefers y
and the corresponding consumption level C(y) over all other y′ < y and their
corresponding consumption. This is sufficient to draw the equivalent budget
of slope si to which this agent is indifferent. This budget is drawn in the
13
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Figure 3: Illustration of a well-being measure that depends on the agent’s
skill: the well-being of an agent with preferences Ri consuming bundle xi is
equal to wi.
figure. It is the 45◦ line ending at (y, C(y)). Indeed, let us observe that
facing such a budget of slope si (remember that si = y), this agent would
choose to work full time. The agent is therefore indifferent between her actual
bundle (y, C(y)) and being free to choose in that budget of slope si. Once
this equivalent budget has been identified, it is not difficult to measure the
well-being of that agent. Indeed, should this agent work half time, she would
have earned wi. This is her well-being measure.
Something less precise but extremely useful can be said about all agents
have the same skill, y, but having chosen to work less. If such an agent
has chosen to earn an income of, say, y′′, then she reveals that she weakly
prefers the bundle (y′′, C(y′′)) to all available bundles, including (y, C(y)).
As a result, even if we cannot identify their equivalent budget precisely, we
know that they are larger (with respect to inclusion) than that of the agent
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Figure 4: Evaluation of a tax function: computing the minimal well-being
level, wi, among agents having a skill level equal to y.
consuming (y, C(y)). This proves that the well-being of all agents having a
skill equal to y is equal to wi or larger.
Now, let us look at the consequence of aggregating well-being levels by
using the leximin criterion. The imprecise information that we gathered so
far is all what we need. Indeed, the only relevant agent, among all agents
with a skill level of y, is the agent working full time, and we have been able
to measure her well-being precisely. It remains to iterate the procedure so as
to measure the minimal well-being level at all skill levels. By doing so, the
worst-off agent in the population can be identified. More precisely, the gross
income earned by the agent that turns out to be the worst off in the economy
can be precisely identified. Observe that she need not be a low-skill agent.
The reform that needs to be implemented is a decrease in the tax paid (or
an increase in the subsidy obtained) by agents earning that gross income.
If the policy assessment question is that of choosing between two tax
systems, then it is sufficient to apply the reasoning above to each one of
them. Once the well-being level of the worst off in each system has been
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identified, it remains to conclude that the system with the largest minimal
well-being level is better than the other.
The reasoning above has allowed us to present the way to evaluate a tax
system in order to identify the reform that needs to be implemented to obtain
allocations higher in the social ranking. This application shows that using a
maximin aggregator is a considerable advantage when one aggregates well-
being measures based on fairness principles and one can only rely on limited
information due to the incentive constraints.
3.2 Poverty measurement
Here, we present an application of egalitarian equivalence to the measurement
of poverty. The theory of poverty measurement, as pioneered by Sen (1976),
considers a vector of individual incomes and a poverty line, that is, an income
threshold under which an agent qualifies as poor. The quantity of poverty
of an economy is computed as a function of the vector of incomes below the
poverty line.
Measuring poverty from an income vector is justified only if incomes are
considered as a good proxy of individual well-being (see Cowell, Chapter ,
this Handbook). There are many reasons, however, why income is a poor
well-being measure. First, there are numerous relevant well-being dimen-
sions that are not marketed. Health is the typical example. Second, there
are many market imperfections, such as transaction costs, discrimination,
price rigidities, etc, which prevent people from freely choosing in their bud-
get. Third, different people may face different prices, depending on where
or when they live, and this fact alone may prevent incomes from being an
interpersonally comparable way of measuring well-being.
A solution to these problems consists in measuring poverty from a multi-
dimensional perspective. Agents are no longer characterized by their income
but by a complete list of their achievements in dimensions that are relevant
for their well-being. The difficult question of how to aggregate these many
dimensions has recently given rise to a large number of contributions. In
line with the SOF approach we present in this chapter, one proposal is to
use agents’ preferences themselves, and to acknowledge heterogeneity in pref-
erences. This is the avenue that Decancq, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2014)
have explored. They have proposed an axiomatic study of multidimensional
poverty measurement based on preferences. Their axiomatic study imposes a
strong decomposition requirement on the poverty measure. As a consequence,
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their solution is almost equivalent to an axiomatic study of the measurement
of well-being (individual well-being being simply the opposite of individual
poverty), and it bears close relationship with the study of well-being measures
developed in Fleurbaey and Tadenuma (2014) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2014).
The axiomatic analysis of Decancq, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2014) does
not start with the definition of a poverty threshold in all dimensions. On the
contrary, it is only assumed that a threshold exists in terms of a minimal level
of satisfaction of the individual preferences. As a consequence of the axioms,
though, the authors show that the only way of measuring poverty precisely
consists in imposing a common minimal consumption bundle. An agent
qualifies as poor if she consumes a bundle she deems worse than the common
minimal bundle. An agent qualifies as non-poor if she consumes a bundle she
deems better than the common minimal bundle. Individual poverty is then
measured by using egalitarian equivalence along the ray from the zero bundle
(the worst bundle for each agent) to the poverty line bundle. This is slightly
different from the Pazner-Schmeidler egalitarian equivalent SOF presented
in Section 2. There, individual well-being levels are measured in terms of
fractions of the social endowment. Here, the key reference point is the poverty
line bundle, and it must be related to the ethical choice of the policy maker
who fixes a minimal consumption in each of the relevant dimensions. The
poverty index one obtains, though, is formally a SOF. In Decancq, Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (2014), only a weak resource equality requirement is imposed.
As a consequence, the resulting SOF is not of the maximin type. On the
contrary, any inequality averse aggregator is acceptable.
Measuring poverty by using such a SOF requires to estimate preferences.
This is the authors’ strategy. Their strategy consists in using satisfaction
data, and taking satisfaction reports as a proxy for the degree of satisfaction
of the preferences (for a related but different use of satisfaction data for policy
evaluation, see Dolan and Fujiwara, chapter , this Handbook). Introducing
fixed effects in the regression allows them to get rid of many non-ordinal
aspects of the satisfaction reports.
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4 Comparison with related approaches
4.1 Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function
Let us begin by noting that SOF’s like the ones we present in this chapter are
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions (see Bergson, 1938, Samuelson,
1947, and Weymark, chapter , this Handbook). The two authors insisted
that their functions could use ordinal and non-comparable information on
preference satisfaction as arguments (for a detailed discussion of the nature
of Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, see Fleurbaey and Mongin,
2005). This is exactly what is done here. Social orderings as we define them
here use ordinal and non-comparable preferences as arguments, and they
satisfy the Pareto criterion.
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions can be viewed as more general
than SOF’s in three ways. First, the well-being levels that they aggregate
need not be only based on ordinal and non-comparable information on pref-
erence satisfaction. The literature in welfare economics has even stressed the
possibility of making interpersonal comparison. Second, the aggregator need
not be in the maximin family.
What makes Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions different from
Arrovian social welfare functions is that the former are not required to satisfy
cross-economies robustness properties. The third reason why our SOF’s are
more specific than Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions is that, as we
explained in Section 2 above, SOF’s do not satisfy the Arrovian Independence
property but do satisfy some weakening of it.
In conclusion, one may see the SOF approach as a systematic study of
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, in which the emphasis is put
on ordinal and non-comparable individual preferences, on the objective of
resource equality, and on weakenings of Arrow’s Independence requirement
that are compatible with resource equality.
4.2 Welfarism
Welfarism is the normative stance that is based on the following two prin-
ciples. First, welfare is an independent normative concept from which in-
dividual well-being measures can be derived. Second, only well-being levels
matter for ethical judgments (detailed surveys are provided, among others,
by Bossert and Weymark, 2004, and d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002; a discus-
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sion of the relationship between Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions
and welfarist social welfare functions is provided by Weymark, Chapter , this
Handbook). Welfarists, however, differ in their interpretation of what notion
of welfare is relevant for the aggregation (for detailed discussion of different
possible notions of well-being, see Bykvist, chapter , Haybron, chapter , and
Hurka, chapter , this Handbook).
Two main notions of welfare are influential in economics. The first notion
was popularized by Harsanyi (1953), Vickrey (1945), Mirrlees (1982), among
many others. They consider that welfare is a real, subjective, measurable and
comparable object. This is in clear contrast with the well-being functions
that turn out being embedded in the SOF’s we are interested in. The second
notion is that welfare is a constructed object that reflects the ethical views
of the policy maker about the determinants of the measurability and the
comparability of well-being among agents.
Welfarism has received strong axiomatic justifications from Sen’s theory
of Social Welfare Functionals. That theory studies how rankings of alloca-
tions can be obtained from requirements of independence of transformation
of welfare levels that precisely capture assumptions on the measurability and
comparability of welfare. Utilitarianism, for instance, is closely related to the
requirement that social rankings be independent of affine transformations of
welfare levels with a common transformation of the units of measurement
(the so-called cardinality and unit-comparability requirement). Leximin, on
the other hand, is closely related to the requirement that social rankings be
independent of any common strictly increasing transformation of the welfare
levels (the so-called co-ordinality requirement; see, for instance, d’Aspremont
and Gevers, 2002, for a survey).
To study the relationship between SOF’s and welfarism, we need to dis-
tinguish between the nature of the social rankings that are obtained and the
way to justify them. In terms of social rankings, one can claim that the
SOF’s that are prominent in the SOF approach are welfarist, as long as we
stick to the second notion of welfare described above, that is, the notion
that welfare indices are constructed objects that reflect the ethical views of
the policy maker. The egalitarian equivalent SOF presented in Section 2
above, for instance, is welfarist in the sense that it uses a welfarist aggrega-
tor, the leximin, to individual well-being indices, that is, the indices that are
constructed by indifference to fractions of the social endowment. These well-
being indices are fully comparable across agents. Even if the analysis starts
with non-comparable preferences, at the end we obtain the way to compare
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the well-being gains of some agents with the losses of some others. Such com-
parisons are, of course, necessary to evaluate policies. The SOF approach
provides us with a theory that deduces the comparisons among agents from
more fundamental requirements, especially resource equality requirements.
In terms of the way to justify social rankings, on the other hand, the SOF
approach is fundamentally non-welfarist. Indeed, requirements of indepen-
dence of transformation of welfare levels are foreign to the SOF approach.
To some extent, the fact that SOF’s look like welfarist social welfare func-
tions is an accident. It simply turns out that imposing Pareto efficiency,
resource equality and robustness requirements forces us 1) to construct well-
being measures based on the bundles of commodities or functioning’s that
are consumed by the agents and 2) to maximize the lowest well-being level,
but this way of ranking allocations does not come from the analysis of which
transformation of welfare levels an index should be independent of.
4.3 The theory of fair allocation
The question of how to allocate resources fairly has originally been raised in
terms of fair allocation rules. In the resulting theory of fair allocation, only
the best allocations are identified (see Thomson, 2011, and chapter , this
Handbook, for a survey). That is, the objective is to justify allocation rules,
which identify the Pareto efficient and fair allocations in each economy from
a domain of economies. Contrary to the SOF approach, the objective is not
to rank the other allocations.
Fair allocation rules have been justified in many different contexts. It is
impossible to give a detailed overview in a few lines. What is important for
our purpose in this chapter is that two rules qualify as the most prominent fair
allocation rules, when the issue is to deal with heterogenous preferences. The
first rule is the following egalitarian equivalent allocation rule. It selects all
Pareto efficient allocations having the property that each agent is indifferent
between her assigned bundle and a common fraction of the social endowment.
The second allocation rule is the equal income Walrasian allocation rules.
It selects the set of allocations that are competitive equilibrium allocation
after the total resources have been divided equally among all agents. At
a competitive equilibrium allocation, each agent maximizes her preferences
over a set of opportunities that is the same for all agents (see Kolm, 1968,
for the first axiomatic study of that rule).
The relationship between those two allocation rules and the two SOF’s
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presented in Section 2 should be clear: each allocation rule selects the al-
locations that are considered socially best for the corresponding SOF. The
theories of allocation rules and SOF’s have a lot in common, in spite of the
former being much more developed than the latter. The main difference,
though, lies in the fact that an allocation rule is silent about suboptimal
allocations. The two applications we presented in the previous section, we
think, have illustrated the advantage of the SOF approach. Indeed, an al-
location rule would have nothing to say in the evaluation of a tax system,
for instance, if the question is to identify the share of the tax scheme that
should be improved, if only small changes can be implemented.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the SOF approach to policy assessment.
We have shown how evaluation criteria can be constructed by a combina-
tion of Pareto, resource equality and robustness requirements. We have also
shown how such criteria can be employed, either by using an argument in-
volving incentive compatibility considerations, or following an estimation of
individual preferences.
The SOF approach is normatively attractive provided one adheres to two
fundamental ethical choices. The first choice is that people’s choices should
be respected. That is implemented by the use of preferences as a basic
ingredient of the analysis and the requirement that the Pareto criterion be
satisfied. The second choice is that economic justice is a matter of fairness,
that is, of equality in the bundles of goods or functioning’s that agents have
access to. Once this choice is made, one still has the freedom to choose among
the many resource equality requirements that can be imposed, as illustrated
above.
A secondary ethical choice that is also implied by the SOF approach is
that preferences are of ordinal and non-comparable nature. Roemer (1998)
is an example of a study of fairness in which individual well-being indices
are assumed to be cardinal and comparable. In the SOF approach, on the
contrary, individual preference satisfaction levels are assumed to be ordinal
and non-comparable. As a matter of fact, constructing SOF’s, as illustrated
above, boils down to constructing a way to cardinalize and/or build compar-
isons among satisfaction levels of different agents, but there is a key difference
between assuming comparability or constructing it on the basis of Pareto, re-
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source equality and robustness requirements.
The fourth characterizing feature of the SOF approach is purely technical.
The formal object one tries to build is a complete ranking of the allocations,
as opposed to the definition of the best allocations. In spite of the purely
technical aspect of this assumption, we believe it is of practical importance
to impose it when the objective is to assess policies. Indeed, having such a
ranking allows us to evaluate reforms, either by comparing a finite set of pos-
sible outcomes or by maximizing the SOF within a small set of allocations in
the neighborhood of the status quo. To put it differently, real economies are
far from being perfect along any ethical dimension and being able to identify
directions of improvement is a legitimate objective of welfare economics.
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